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KRAUSE, Circuit Judge. 
 The Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) allows a 
child under the age of twenty-one whose alien parent has 
married a U.S. citizen abroad to obtain a temporary “K-4” 
visa to accompany her parent to the United States and, based 
on the parent’s marriage, to apply to adjust her status to that 
of a lawful permanent resident.  On a petition for review of a 
decision of the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA), we now 
consider the validity of a regulation that makes it impossible 
for a child who entered on such a visa to remain with her 
3 
 
family and adjust her status from within the United States if 
she was over the age of eighteen at the time of her parent’s 
marriage.  Because the regulation departs from the plain 
language of the INA, contravenes congressional intent, and 
exceeds the permissible scope of the Attorney General’s 
regulatory authority, we conclude it is invalid.  We therefore 
will grant the petition for review and will reverse and remand 
to the BIA for further proceedings. 
I. Background 
As a general matter, aliens abroad who have relatives 
in the United States may be eligible to obtain lawful 
permanent residence, but because it can take months or even 
years for the pertinent paperwork to be processed, these aliens 
may spend significant time separated from their loved ones 
while they wait in their home countries for the appropriate 
visa approval.  See, e.g., 8 U.S.C. §§ 1151-1154; 146 Cong. 
Rec. 27,160 (2000) (describing the lengthy delays faced by 
those seeking relative-based visas).  Congress sought to 
ameliorate this problem for the immediate family members of 
U.S. citizens through the creation, initially, of K-1 visas for 
alien fiancé(e)s of U.S. citizens and then, more recently, of K-
3 visas for alien spouses of U.S. citizens.  In addition, and of 
particular significance for this case, Congress also provided 
for K-2 and K-4 visas for, respectively, the minor children of 
fiancé(e)s and spouses, up to age twenty-one.1 
                                              
 1 The statutes relevant to K-2 and K-4 visa holders 
refer to them as “minor child[ren],” 8 U.S.C. 
§§ 1101(a)(15)(K)(iii), 1255(d), a term the BIA has long held, 
and the parties do not dispute, has the same meaning as 
“child” under 8 U.S.C. § 1101(b)(1).  See, e.g., In re Le, 25 I. 
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Once reunited with their families stateside, aliens with 
one of these K-visas may apply for and, subject to the 
discretion of the Attorney General, attain lawful permanent 
residence without leaving the United States through a process 
called “adjustment of status.”  Petitioner in this case properly 
obtained a K-4 visa as the nineteen-year-old daughter of a K-
3 alien spouse and accompanied her mother to the United 
States to live with her stepfather, a U.S. citizen, while 
Petitioner and her mother applied for adjustment of status.  
Petitioner’s applications have been denied, however, on 
account of a regulation that effectively bars any child with a 
K-4 visa who was between the ages of eighteen and twenty-
one at the time of her parent’s marriage from obtaining lawful 
permanent residence without first returning overseas.  Our 
analysis of Petitioner’s challenges to the validity of this 
                                                                                                     
& N. Dec. 541, 547-50 (BIA 2011); see also 8 C.F.R. 
§ 214.2(k)(3).  “Child” is defined as “an unmarried person 
under twenty-one” who fits within one of the subcategories 
under § 1101(b)(1), some of which impose additional age 
requirements.  For purposes of this case, Petitioner was born 
to her biological mother (by all representations, in wedlock) 
and thus is not subject to additional age restrictions.  
§ 1101(b)(1)(A).  Accordingly, our regular reference in this 
opinion to children under the age of twenty-one should not be 
construed to implicitly remove the additional age restrictions 
on accessing a K-visa that would accompany certain 
categories of children.  E.g., § 1101(b)(1)(E)(i) (generally 
restricting adopted children from the definition of “child” 
under the INA if they were over the age of sixteen at the time 
of the adoption).  As discussed in more detail below, infra 
notes 11 & 15, we accept the BIA’s interpretation of the term 
“minor child.” 
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regulation requires an understanding of the statutory and 
regulatory regime that governs K-visa holders, as well as the 
factual and procedural history of Petitioner’s case.  We 
address each below. 
A. Statutory and Regulatory Context 
The story of K-visas begins in 1970, when Congress 
created K-1 and K-2 visas to allow the fiancé(e)s of U.S. 
citizens and such fiancé(e)s’ unmarried children under the age 
of twenty-one, respectively, to obtain temporary, 
nonimmigrant status.  Assuming the fiancé(e) and the U.S. 
citizen married within three months, that status would allow 
the fiancé(e) and children to await processing of their 
applications for lawful permanent residence from within the 
United States.  Act of Apr. 7, 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-225, 
§ 1(b), 84 Stat. 116, 116.  In their original form, K-1 and K-2 
visas triggered automatic lawful permanent residence for the 
visa holders once the marriage was complete.  See id. at 
§ 3(b).  This feature had the perverse effect, however, of 
encouraging fraudulent marriages whereby some aliens 
obtained K-1 visas and married U.S. citizens with the 
intention to dissolve the marriage once they obtained lawful 
permanent residence.  In re Sesay, 25 I. & N. Dec. 431, 435-
38 (BIA 2011) (describing this marriage fraud problem). 
In 1986, Congress sought to curb such marriage fraud 
by passing the Immigration Marriage Fraud Amendments 
(IMFA), Pub. L. No. 99-639, 100 Stat. 3537 (1986), which 
replaced K-1 and K-2 aliens’ streamlined method of obtaining 
lawful permanent residence with the more structured 
“adjustment of status” process.  IMFA § 3(c); see also Carpio 
v. Holder, 592 F.3d 1091, 1094 (10th Cir. 2010) (describing 
the post-IMFA requirement that K-visa holders file an 
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application for adjustment of status in order to obtain lawful 
permanent residence).  Since the passage of the IMFA, K-1 
and K-2 aliens are required to apply to adjust their status like 
other aliens through the strictures of 8 U.S.C. § 1255(a), 
which gives the Attorney General the discretion to provide 
lawful permanent residence to certain aliens without requiring 
them to first return to their countries of origin.  See IMFA 
§ 3(c).  K-visa holders’ adjustment of status under § 1255(a) 
is constrained by 8 U.S.C. § 1186a, which renders an alien’s 
permanent status conditional for two years, after which time 
the Government conducts an interview with the couple to 
reaffirm the legitimacy of the marital union; if the 
Government is satisfied, the status for both the alien spouse 
and her children becomes truly permanent.  IMFA § 2. 
To apply for status adjustment under § 1255(a), an 
alien must take three steps: (1) file an application to adjust 
status; (2) demonstrate eligibility under existing law to adjust 
status; and (3) show that a permanent visa is immediately 
available.2  8 U.S.C. § 1255(a).  Once an application is filed, 
                                              
 2 This third requirement refers to the limited number of 
permanent visas apportioned to a given nation.  Spouses and 
children of U.S. citizens do not have to wait for such visas 
because a separate statute makes permanent visas always 
available to them regardless of their country of origin.  
8 U.S.C. § 1151(b)(2)(A)(i).  Meanwhile, children of lawful 
permanent residents may obtain lawful permanent residence 
themselves, but must wait for a country-specific visa to 
become available.  8 U.S.C. § 1153(a)(2).  Notably, even if a 
K-visa holder’s parent becomes a citizen (as has Petitioner’s 
mother), a K-visa holder must adjust through the § 1255(a) 
process and cannot invoke a different basis for adjustment at 
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the ultimate decision as to whether that application is granted 
is left to the discretion of the Attorney General, who also has 
authority to promulgate regulations governing the adjustment 
of status process.  Id.  The IMFA also created 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1255(d), which, in its first iteration, barred the Attorney 
General from adjusting a nonimmigrant’s status solely on the 
basis of the K-visa.  IMFA §§ 2(e), 3(b).  That had the effect 
of forcing K-1 and K-2 aliens to satisfy § 1255(a)(2)’s 
eligibility requirement through the traditional means available 
under the INA to alien family members—by proving a legally 
cognizable familial relationship with the U.S. citizen 
petitioner under 8 U.S.C. § 1151(b)(2)(A)(i), such as a marital 
or a parent-child relationship.  See, e.g., Kondrachuk v. U.S. 
Citizenship & Immigr. Servs., No. C 08–5476 CW, 2009 WL 
1883720, at *1-2 (N.D. Cal. June 30, 2009) (describing the 
adjustment process for K-visa holders under § 1255(a)).  
Procedurally, this meant that once the marriage took place, 
not only the K-1 alien parent but also each K-2 stepchild 
would need to prove eligibility through the submission of an 
I-130 petition—a petition filed by the U.S. citizen attesting 
that the K-2 alien was the “child” of the U.S. citizen.  See id.; 
Dep’t of Homeland Sec., Instructions for Form I-130, Petition 
for Alien Relative (Mar. 23, 2015), available at 
https://www.uscis.gov/sites/default/files/files/form/i-
130instr.pdf (last visited Mar. 22, 2016) (hereinafter 
“Instructions for Form I-130”). 
This new requirement, however, produced an 
unintended consequence for some K-2 children because, 
under the INA, a stepchild only qualifies as a “child” of a 
                                                                                                     
a later date, e.g., adjustment based on her parent’s 
naturalization.  See 8 C.F.R. § 245.1(c)(6)(ii). 
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U.S. citizen if “the child had not reached the age of eighteen 
years at the time the marriage creating the status of stepchild 
occurred.”  8 U.S.C. § 1101(b)(1)(B).  Thus, an alien child up 
to age twenty-one could obtain a K-2 visa and accompany her 
alien parent and any younger siblings to the United States, 
but, if she was eighteen to twenty-one years old when the 
marriage took place, the U.S. stepparent could not file an I-
130 petition on her behalf.  The stepchild, in other words, had 
no mechanism to satisfy the requirements of § 1255(a)(2) and 
no other means to adjust status from within the United States.  
See, e.g., Kondrachuk, 2009 WL 1883720, at *1-2 
(recounting the effect of the IMFA on K-2 visa holders); see 
also Memorandum from Michael L. Aytes, Assoc. Dir., U.S. 
Citizenship & Immigr. Servs. Domestic Ops., Regarding 
Adjustment of Status for K-2 Aliens (Mar. 15, 2007), 
available at https://www.uscis.gov/sites/default/
files/USCIS/Laws/Memoranda/Static_Files_Memoranda/
k2adjuststatus031507.pdf (last visited Mar. 22, 2016) (“Aytes 
Memorandum”) (confirming the unintentional IMFA-created 
gap).  The upshot was that, upon expiration of her K-2 visa, 
the stepchild was required to separate from her parents and 
siblings and to return to her home country to apply for 
admission to the United States from abroad based on her alien 
parent’s newfound status as a lawful permanent resident.  See 
8 U.S.C. § 1153(a)(2); Kondrachuk, 2009 WL 1883720, at *2 
& n.3 (explaining that because an immigrant visa is not 
“immediately available” to a K-2 child based on the lawful 
permanent resident status of her alien parent, such child may 
not adjust status within the United States via § 1255(a)). 
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 This unintentional gap for older K-2 children3 
prompted the then-existing Immigration and Naturalization 
Service (INS)4 to take corrective action only two years after 
the IMFA passed, which led—in conjunction with statutory 
amendments passed by Congress in the same year—to the 
regime that governs the status adjustment process for K-2 
children today.  The INS promulgated 8 C.F.R. 
§ 214.2(k)(6)(ii) (the “gap-filler”), under which a K-2 visa 
holder is deemed eligible to apply for status adjustment based 
solely on her K-1 parent “contracting a valid marriage to” the 
U.S. citizen who originally petitioned for the K-1 visa (so 
long as the marriage occurs within ninety days of the K-1 
parent’s “admission as a nonimmigrant pursuant to a valid K-
1 visa”).  See also Marriage Fraud Amendments Regulations, 
53 Fed. Reg. 30,011, 30,017-18 (Aug. 10, 1988) 
(Supplementary Information).  This gap-filling regulation 
                                              
 3 Throughout this opinion, we use the descriptors 
“older K-2” and “older K-4” to refer to a child who is under 
twenty-one and thus young enough to obtain a K-2 or K-4 
visa, but who was also over eighteen at the time of her 
parent’s marriage and thus too old to qualify under 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1101(b)(1)(B) as the “child” of her new stepparent. 
 
 4 On March 1, 2003, the INS was disbanded as an 
independent agency within the United States Department of 
Justice, and its functions were reassigned to the United States 
Department of Homeland Security.  Homeland Security Act 
of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-296, §§ 441, 451 & 471, 116 Stat. 
2135, 2177-2212, codified at 6 U.S.C. §§ 251, 271 & 291.  
The INS was the agency responsible for promulgating all the 
regulations at issue in this case. 
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eliminated the need for a K-2 child to prove eligibility 
through her stepparent’s I-130 petition by hinging the child’s 
eligibility instead on her parent’s marriage and not on her 
relationship with the U.S. stepparent.  See In re Akram, 25 I. 
& N. Dec. 874, 878 & n.6 (BIA 2012) (citing In re Le, 25 I. & 
N. Dec. 541, 546 (BIA 2011) and In re Sesay, 25 I. & N. Dec. 
at 438-40); In re Le, 25 I & N. Dec. at 550; Aytes 
Memorandum. 
While the rulemaking process for the gap-filler was 
underway, Congress also was legislating to the same effect, 
and only a few months after the gap-filler was finalized, 
President Reagan signed into law the Immigration Technical 
Corrections Act of 1988 (ITCA), Pub. L. No. 100-525, 102 
Stat. 2609, which added language to § 1255(d) that serves 
virtually the same function as the gap-filler for K-1 and K-2 
visas—the only K-visas then in existence.  The ITCA 
amended § 1255(d) to allow the Attorney General to adjust 
the status of a K-visa holder “as a result of the marriage of the 
nonimmigrant (or, in the case of a minor child, the parent) to 
the citizen who filed the petition to accord that alien’s [K-1 or 
K-2] nonimmigrant status,” thus making explicit that 
eligibility for even an older K-2 child’s status adjustment 
turned on the marriage and not whether the alien qualified as 
her stepparent’s “child” under 8 U.S.C. § 1101(b)(1)(B).  See 
ITCA § 7(b). 
 More than a decade later, in recognition of the fact that 
K-visas benefited only alien fiancé(e)s and their children 
while alien spouses and their children (who were already 
stepchildren of U.S. citizens) still had to wait out approval of 
their lawful permanent residence from abroad, Congress 
expanded the K-visa program to create K-3 visas for foreign 
spouses and K-4 visas for their minor children.  See The 
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Legal Immigration Family Equity (LIFE) Act, Pub. L. No. 
106-553, § 1103(a), 114 Stat. 2762, 2762A-142 (2000) (as 
amended 2000); H.R. Rep. No. 106-1048, at 229-30 (2001).  
Because the marriage has already taken place, the process for 
obtaining these visas and adjusting status under the LIFE Act 
varies slightly from that governing K-1 and K-2 visa holders.  
To obtain a K-3 visa, the U.S. spouse must file two forms: an 
I-129F petition, which lists the alien spouse’s children, 
requires submission of a valid marriage certificate, and serves 
as the petition for the K-visa itself, and an I-130 petition, 
which identifies the marital relationship between the spouses 
and begins the process for conferral of permanent residence.  
See In re Akram, 25 I. & N. Dec. at 877; 8 C.F.R. 
§ 214.2(k)(7); Dep’t of Homeland Sec., Instructions for 
Petition for Alien Fiancé(e)5 (June 13, 2013), available at 
https://www.uscis.gov/sites/default/files/files/form/i-
129finstr.pdf (last visited Mar. 22, 2016); Instructions for 
Form I-130.  Upon approval of the I-129F petition and a 
subsequent interview at a United States embassy or consulate 
in the aliens’ home country,6 a K-3 visa is issued to the alien 
                                              
 5 While the I-129F petition is still called the “Petition 
for Alien Fiancé(e),” its instructions expressly indicate that it 
is also the proper form to file on behalf of a K-3 spouse.  66 
Fed. Reg. 42,587, 42,589 (Aug. 14, 2001) (explaining that, 
upon passage of the LIFE Act, the INS would “use the Form 
1-129F [to consider petitions for K-3 and K-4 visas] until 
further notice”). 
 
 6 At this interview, each alien seeking a K-3 or K-4 
visa must provide the following: (1) an individual Form DS-
160 application for each individual (including one for each 
child, though each child’s eligibility is ultimately tied to the 
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spouse and K-4 visas are issued to the unmarried children of 
the alien spouse under the age of twenty-one.  In re Akram, 
25 I. & N. Dec. at 877; 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(k)(3).  A K-4 visa 
then lasts for two years or until a child’s twenty-first birthday, 
whichever comes first.  8 C.F.R. § 214.2(k)(8). 
 Consistent with the goal of reunifying families 
stateside pending approval of their permanent residence, the 
LIFE Act also amended certain portions of the INA, 
reflecting an intention that K-2 and K-4 children would be 
accorded the same treatment.  The LIFE Act reorganized the 
subsection that creates all K-visas by authorizing K-1 visas 
for fiancé(e)s in 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15)(K)(i), K-3 visas for 
spouses in § 1101(a)(15)(K)(ii), and K-2 and K-4 visas for 
both categories of children (the children of K-1s and K-3s, 
respectively) in § 1101(a)(15)(K)(iii).  LIFE Act § 1103(a).  
Thus, Congress provided for the issuance of both K-2 and K-
4 visas in the same statutory section, defined their intended 
                                                                                                     
single I-129F form filed by the American citizen); (2) a valid 
passport; (3) original or certified copies of birth certificates, 
the marriage certificate for the marriage to the U.S. citizen 
spouse, divorce or death certificates for any previous 
marriages, and police certificates identifying past and present 
countries of residence; (4) proof of a medical examination; 
(5) evidence of financial support; (6) passport-style 
photographs; (7) additional evidence of the spouse’s 
relationship with the U.S. citizen; and (8) application fees for 
each visa recipient.  U.S. Dep’t of State: Bureau of Consular 
Affairs, Nonimmigrant Visa for a Spouse (K-3), 
https://travel.state.gov/content/visas/en/immigrate/family/spo
use-citizen.html (last visited Mar. 22, 2016). 
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recipients in the same terms as “the minor child[ren] of [K-1 
or K-3 visa holders] [who are] accompanying, or following to 
join [their alien parents],”  8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15)(K)(iii), and 
extended § 1255(d)—the section that tied K-2 children’s 
eligibility for adjustment of status under § 1255(a)(2) to “the 
marriage of the [child’s parent] . . . to the citizen”—to K-4 
children as well, see LIFE Act § 1103(c)(3). 
 Notwithstanding Congress’s clear articulation of its 
intent to accord the same reunification benefits to K-4 
children as enjoyed by their K-2 counterparts, the INS took 
the opposite tack.  It not only failed to amend the 8 C.F.R. 
§ 214.2(k)(6)(ii) gap-filler to reach older K-4 children or to 
promulgate a new regulation to plug any perceived gap for 
such individuals, it also promulgated 8 C.F.R. § 245.1(i) (“the 
Regulation”), which recreated for older K-4 children the very 
gap that § 1255(d) and 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(k)(6)(ii) had filled 
for older K-2 children.  See “K” Nonimmigrant Classification 
for Spouses of U.S. Citizens and Their Children Under the 
Legal Immigration Family Equity Act of 2000, 66 Fed. Reg. 
42,587, 42,594 (Aug. 14, 2001) (Supplementary Information).  
That is, instead of signaling that a K-4 child may adjust status 
without being the beneficiary of a separate I-130 petition (an 
impossibility for an alien child who does not qualify as the 
“child” of her U.S. stepparent by virtue of having been over 
eighteen at the time of the marriage), the Regulation provides: 
An alien admitted to the United States as a K-4 
under [8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15)(K)(iii)] may 
apply for adjustment of status to that of 
permanent residence pursuant to [8 U.S.C. 
§ 1255] at any time following the approval of 
the Form I-130 petition filed on the alien’s 
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behalf, by the same citizen who petitioned for 
the alien’s parent’s K-3 status. 
8 C.F.R. § 245.1(i) (emphasis added).   
The Regulation thus ensnares a K-4 child who was 
over the age of eighteen at the time of her parent’s marriage 
in a legal quandary.  Having qualified for the K-4 visa to 
accompany her parent and younger siblings to the United 
States to reunite with her U.S. stepparent, a K-4 child 
between ages eighteen and twenty-one is limited by the 
Regulation to obtaining lawful permanent residence only by 
way of an I-130 petition filed by her stepparent—a petition 
which § 1101(b)(1)(B) precludes that stepparent from filing 
for a stepchild in this age group.  Such a child, in other words, 
has no recourse but to leave her family behind in the United 
States and return to her home country to apply for a 
permanent visa from abroad.7 
It may seem strange to impose this plight on the 
children of alien spouses given that the children of alien 
fiancé(e)s may adjust status as a direct consequence of the 
marriage and without having to independently demonstrate a 
parent-child relationship with their U.S. stepparents under 
§ 1101(b)(1)(B); that both K-2 and K-4 children obtain their 
                                              
7 A K-4 child who was under eighteen at the time of 
her parent’s marriage is still able to apply for adjustment of 
status under the Regulation because, due to her age at the 
time of the marriage, she would still qualify as her 
stepparent’s “child” under § 1101(b)(1)(B).  Her I-130 
petition thus could be approved and would render her eligible 
to apply for permanent residence under § 1255(a).  
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nonimmigrant visas under § 1101(a)(15)(K)(iii); and that both 
K-2 and K-4 children derive their eligibility to adjust status 
from the same source: § 1255(d).  The Regulation, however, 
does just that.  In re Akram, 25 I. & N. Dec. at 879-81, 883 
(confirming that the Regulation establishes this catch-22 for 
older K-4 children and expressly acknowledging that the 
8 C.F.R. § 214.2(k)(6)(ii) gap-filling regulation absolves K-2 
children of the same fate).  Although the Seventh Circuit, in 
Akram v. Holder, 721 F.3d 853, 864-65 (7th Cir. 2013), 
struck down the Regulation as ultra vires, the Government 
has continued to enforce it outside that Circuit—in this case 
visiting its consequences upon Petitioner Si Min Cen. 
B. Factual and Procedural Background 
 Cen is a Chinese national who was nineteen when her 
mother married a U.S. citizen in China.  After properly 
obtaining her K-4 visa and moving to the United States with 
her mother, Cen filed an application to adjust her status.  As 
required by the Regulation, Cen’s U.S. stepfather filed an I-
130 petition on her behalf, but that petition and hence Cen’s 
application were denied because Cen was nineteen when her 
mother married and therefore could not be deemed her 
stepfather’s “child” under § 1101(b)(1)(B) for purposes of her 
stepfather’s I-130 petition.8 
At the same time, however, the Regulation also 
precluded Cen from adjusting her status on the basis of her 
                                              
 8 It is undisputed that, once Cen passed her twenty-first 
birthday, her K-4 visa expired, 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(k)(8), and if 
she remains in the United States today, she does so without 
authorization. 
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mother’s immigration status.  After becoming a lawful 
permanent resident, Cen’s mother filed an I-130 petition on 
Cen’s behalf, which, because Cen is the biological child of 
her mother, was approved by the Government.  On the basis 
of this approved I-130 petition, Cen again applied for 
adjustment of status, but she was denied this time because 
even though her mother’s I-130 petition on her behalf had 
been approved—and even though her mother by that point 
had become a naturalized U.S. citizen—the Regulation 
specifies that, in order to be eligible for status adjustment, a 
K-4 child’s I-130 petition must be filed by “the same citizen 
who petitioned for the alien’s parent’s K-3 status,” i.e., the 
U.S. stepparent.  8 C.F.R. § 245.1(i). 
Thwarted at every turn, Cen turned to the courts, 
challenging the Regulation and the denial of her application 
in the U.S. District Court for the District of New Jersey.  At 
least initially, Cen was again blocked when the Government 
opened removal proceedings against her for overstaying her 
original K-4 visa and served her with a Notice to Appear.  
Because that action created a new administrative remedy for 
Cen to pursue, the District Court lost subject matter 
jurisdiction and Cen’s complaint was voluntarily dismissed. 
Cen duly appeared before an immigration judge (IJ) in 
Newark, who determined that Cen was not entitled to relief 
due to the Regulation.  Bound by the BIA’s precedential 
opinion in In re Akram, 25 I. & N. Dec. 874 (BIA 2012), the 
IJ concluded that Cen could only seek to adjust through an I-
130 petition filed by her U.S. stepfather, not her mother, and 
that her stepfather’s petition could not be approved because 
Cen, who was nineteen at the time of the marriage, did not 
qualify as her stepfather’s “child” under § 1101(b)(1)(B).  
Cen appealed this decision to the BIA, which affirmed the IJ 
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and rooted its decision in In re Akram.  The BIA determined 
(1) that the legislative history and structure of the relevant 
immigration laws supported the Regulation’s requirement that 
only the stepparent may file an I-130 petition for a K-4 visa 
holder, (2) that the BIA did not itself have authority to declare 
regulations invalid in any event, and (3) that despite the 
Seventh Circuit having previously rejected In re Akram and 
struck down the Regulation, see Akram, 721 F.3d at 864-65, 
the BIA was not bound by that decision outside the Seventh 
Circuit.   
Cen now petitions this Court for review of the BIA’s 
decision, arguing that the Regulation is ultra vires under 
Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 
Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984), and that she therefore should be 
able to adjust her status either by way of an I-130 petition 
filed by her mother or, like her K-2 counterparts, 
automatically upon her mother’s adjustment, i.e., on the basis 
of the marriage itself.9  
                                              
 9 In the alternative, Cen argues that the Regulation 
irrationally distinguishes between K-2 and K-4 children in 
violation of her constitutional right to equal protection under 
the law.  Because we resolve this case on Chevron grounds, 
we do not reach Cen’s constitutional claim.  See, e.g., Lyng v. 
Nw. Indian Cemetery Protective Ass’n, 485 U.S. 439, 445 
(1988) (“A fundamental and longstanding principle of judicial 
restraint requires that courts avoid reaching constitutional 
questions in advance of the necessity of deciding them.”); 
accord Akram, 721 F.3d at 858, 865. 
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II. Jurisdiction and Standards of Review 
 We have jurisdiction to review final decisions of the 
BIA under 8 U.S.C. § 1252.  In this case, we review the 
BIA’s decision de novo, subject to the principles of Chevron 
deference because we are considering the propriety of a 
regulation that has gone through notice-and-comment 
rulemaking, United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 226-
27 (2001), and because the BIA’s decision rests on legal 
determinations made in its precedential opinion of In re 
Akram, see INS v. Aguirre-Aguirre, 526 U.S. 415, 425 (1999); 
Orozco-Velasquez v. Att’y Gen., --- F.3d ---, No. 13-1685, 
2016 WL 930241, at *2 (3d Cir. Mar. 11, 2016).10 
III. Discussion 
 Under the familiar two-step Chevron analysis, we first 
determine under Step One if Congress has “directly addressed 
the precise question at issue,” and if so, we strike down a 
regulation that is contrary to Congress’s “unambiguously 
expressed intent.” Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842-43.  At Step One, 
we consider the statutory text, as well as “traditional tools of 
statutory construction,” including canons of construction and 
the broader statutory context.  Shalom Pentecostal Church v. 
                                              
 10 In its brief, the Government references the deference 
courts afford to an agency’s interpretation of its own 
regulations under Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452, 461 (1997).  
Here, the BIA interpreted the Regulation’s effect in In re 
Akram in a manner that is indeed consistent with the language 
of the Regulation.  We address below the underlying question 
whether the Regulation itself is a permissible construction of 
the INA, and we therefore review it through the lens of 
Chevron.  
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Acting Sec’y U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 783 F.3d 156, 
164-65 (3d Cir. 2015); United States v. Geiser, 527 F.3d 288, 
292-94 (3d Cir. 2008).   If, however, “the statute is silent or 
ambiguous with respect to the specific issue,” we move on to 
Step Two, where “the question for the court is whether the 
agency’s [regulation] is based on a permissible construction 
of the statute.”  Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843.  At Step Two, we 
may consider “the plain language of the statute, its origin, and 
purpose” in reviewing the reasonableness of a regulation.  
Zheng v. Gonzales, 422 F.3d 98, 119 (3d Cir. 2005) (quoting 
Appalachian States Low-Level Radioactive Waste Comm’n v. 
O’Leary, 93 F.3d 103, 110 (3d Cir. 1996)).  Step Two affords 
agencies considerable deference, and “where Congress has 
not merely failed to address a precise question, but has given 
an ‘express delegation of authority to the agency to elucidate 
a specific provision of the statute by regulation,’ then the 
agency’s ‘legislative regulations are given controlling weight 
unless they are arbitrary, capricious, or manifestly contrary to 
the statute.’”  Zheng, 422 F.3d at 112 (quoting Chevron, 467 
U.S. at 843-44).  But deference under Step Two is not 
absolute, and the regulation must still “harmonize[]” with the 
statute, id. at 119 (quoting O’Leary, 93 F.3d at 110), and be 
“reasonable in light of the legislature’s revealed design,” 
NationsBank of N.C., N.A. v. Variable Annuity Life Ins. Co., 
513 U.S. 251, 257 (1995).  Here, both parties urge that we 
resolve the case at Step One, and there we begin.   
A. The Legitimacy of the Regulation Cannot be 
Resolved at Step One 
 The Government argues that § 1255(d)’s plain text 
unambiguously evinces Congress’s intent to bar older K-4 
children from eligibility to apply for adjustment of status 
under § 1255(a) because they cannot establish a 
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§ 1101(b)(1)(B)-compliant relationship with their U.S. 
stepparents.  Cen urges the opposite reading: that because 
§ 1255(d) authorizes status adjustment “as a result of the 
marriage of” the K-3 parent and U.S. stepparent, all K-4 
children under twenty-one are unambiguously eligible to 
adjust status on the basis of the marriage alone rather than the 
parent-child relationship with their stepparents.  Were the 
Government correct that the plain language of the INA 
categorically bars older K-4 children from eligibility, we 
would have no need to proceed beyond Step One because the 
Regulation would reflect Congress’s clearly stated intent.  As 
explained below, however, we can dispose of this contention 
in short order because the two arguments pressed by the 
Government at Step One are untethered from the text of the 
statute. 
First, the Government cherry-picks language from 
§ 1255(d) to urge that its authorization for the Attorney 
General to adjust status on account of  “. . . the citizen who 
filed the petition to accord that alien’s nonimmigrant status” 
expressly identifies the U.S. stepparent as the basis for any 
adjustment and amounts to an unambiguous, affirmative 
requirement that a K-4 child prove a legally cognizable 
parent-child relationship with that stepparent to be eligible to 
adjust status under § 1255(a).  But, in full, the relevant 
portion of § 1255(d) reads that the Attorney General may 
adjust the status of an alien “as a result of the marriage of the 
nonimmigrant (or, in the case of a minor child, the parent) to 
the citizen who filed the petition to accord that alien’s 
nonimmigrant status under [8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15)(K)].”  
8 U.S.C. § 1255(d) (emphasis added).  The Government, in 
other words, would have us excise the “as a result of the 
marriage of . . . the parent” language that immediately 
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precedes the excerpt on which it relies and thereby accord the 
statute an entirely different meaning.  We do not pay such 
short shrift to Congress’s words.  See, e.g., Inhabitants of 
Montclair Twp. v. Ramsdell, 107 U.S. 147, 152 (1883) (“It is 
the duty of the court to give effect, if possible, to every clause 
and word of a statute[.]”).  Instead, the reference to the 
marriage between a K-4 child’s parent and the U.S. stepparent 
precludes reading § 1255(d) to unambiguously require a K-4 
child to prove a parent-child relationship with her stepparent.  
Indeed, not only does the text of § 1255(d) nowhere indicate 
that a parent-child relationship must be proven, but by its 
terms, it expressly predicates a K-4 child’s eligibility on the 
marital relationship between her K-3 parent and U.S. 
stepparent (a topic to which we will return in Part III.B.1 
below). 
The Government’s second attempt to anchor the 
Regulation’s requirement in the plain text of the statute fares 
no better.  The Government would have us string together a 
series of INA provisions that it insists, when read in tandem, 
plainly and unambiguously require a K-4 child to demonstrate 
a parent-child relationship with her U.S. stepparent to be 
eligible to adjust status under § 1255(a).  Specifically, the 
Government argues that § 1255(d) does not absolve K-4 
children from satisfying the three adjustment of status 
requirements of § 1255(a); that a K-4 child therefore must 
demonstrate eligibility and availability of an immigrant visa 
like any other alien family member of a U.S. citizen by 
complying with 8 U.S.C. § 1154(a)(1)(A)(i), which provides 
that a U.S. citizen “claiming that an alien is entitled to . . . an 
immediate relative status . . . may file a petition with the 
Attorney General for such classification”; and that the 
Supreme Court’s statement in INS v. Miranda, 459 U.S. 14, 
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15 & n.2 (1982) (per curiam), that a “visa petition” is 
sufficient to satisfy the § 1255(a)(3) visa availability 
requirement means that an I-130 petition (which, in the case 
of K-4 children, would require compliance with the 
§ 1101(b)(1) definition of “child”) is the proper method of 
satisfying § 1154(a)(1)(A)(i).  Ergo, according to the 
Government, § 1255(d) clearly and unambiguously provides 
that the filing of an I-130 petition by the K-4 child’s U.S. 
stepparent is the exclusive means by which a K-4 child may 
adjust status. 
 As a threshold matter, we would hesitate to conclude 
that Congress clearly intended to deprive older K-4 children 
of any opportunity to adjust status from within the United 
States when the several disparate sections of the INA that, 
together, supposedly erect this bar lack a single cross-
reference.  See Restrepo v. Att’y Gen., 617 F.3d 787, 792-93 
(3d Cir. 2010) (according significance to the absence of a 
cross-reference when interpreting a statute); United States v. 
Alvarez, 519 F.2d 1036, 1044 (3d Cir. 1975) (same).  The 
Government’s premises, in any event, suffer three 
fundamental flaws.   
 First, there is no question that, when Congress has not 
provided otherwise, the eligibility of an immediate relative to 
adjust status under § 1255(a) is typically satisfied by the 
filing of an I-130 petition in accordance with 
§ 1154(a)(1)(A)(i).  For K-visa holders, however, the 
language of § 1255(d) suggests Congress did provide 
otherwise, authorizing these aliens to apply instead on the 
basis of the qualifying marriage.   
 Second, the language in § 1154(a)(1)(A)(i) is neither 
mandatory nor exclusive; indeed, while one “may” file an I-
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130 petition to prove eligibility, that is not the only method of 
adjustment, nor would that be a sensible reading given that 
the 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(k)(6)(ii) gap-filler already allows K-2 
children to adjust under § 1255(a) without filing an I-130 
petition at all.  Likewise, INS v. Miranda merely recognized 
that a “visa petition” “would have satisfied” the § 1255(a)(3) 
requirement; it did not hold that a visa petition was the 
exclusive means to satisfy § 1255(a).  459 U.S. at 15 & n.2. 
 Third, even assuming arguendo that a separate I-130 
petition may be required for a K-4 child to adjust status, 
nothing in § 1255(d) or § 1154(a)(1)(A)(i) supports the 
Regulation’s requirement that such a petition be filed by the 
U.S. stepparent and not by the alien parent once he or she has 
obtained lawful permanent residence or, as in this case, 
citizenship status.   
 In view of these deficiencies in the Government’s 
plain language argument, we cannot resolve this case at 
Chevron Step One.  Nor need we linger at Step One on 
account of Cen’s own plain language argument, for even 
assuming that the INA on its face permits older K-4 children 
to apply for adjustment of status under § 1255(d), Congress 
expressly delegated to the Attorney General in § 1255(a) the 
authority to regulate eligibility to apply for adjustment of 
status, and we held in Zheng v. Gonzales that “the text of INA 
section [1255(a)] leaves some ambiguity about whether the 
Attorney General may determine by regulation what classes 
of aliens are eligible to apply for adjustment of status, thus 
precluding reliance on the first prong of the Chevron test.”   
422 F.3d at 120.  As in Zheng, the Regulation bars a category 
of aliens from adjusting their status under § 1255(a), and such 
regulations are “subject to review for reasonableness under 
the second prong of the Chevron test.”  Id. at 114.  We 
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therefore proceed to Step Two to consider whether the 
Regulation falls within the scope of the Attorney General’s 
delegated authority. 11   
                                              
11 Of course, a determination that the language of 
§ 1255(d) is itself ambiguous would be an independent reason 
to proceed to Chevron Step Two.  On the one hand, for the 
reasons set forth below, there is a compelling argument that 
the statutory language and structure of the INA clearly and 
unambiguously authorize older K-4 children to apply for 
adjustment of status on the basis of their parent’s marriage 
and without proving an independent parent-child relationship 
with their stepparent.  See infra Part III.B.1.  On the other 
hand, the Government argues that the interplay of 
§§ 1101(b)(1)(B), 1154(a)(1)(A)(i), 1255(a), and 1255(d) 
makes the statute at worst ambiguous, and, while no party 
here disputes that the term “minor child” in 
§§ 1101(a)(15)(K)(iii) and 1255(d) has the same meaning as 
“child” in § 1101(b)(1), the INA is not explicit on this point.  
We need not decide whether § 1255(d) is itself ambiguous, 
however, because Zheng mandates in any event that we 
review the Regulation at Step Two as an exercise of the 
Attorney General’s delegated authority to regulate eligibility.  
422 F.3d at 119-20.  To the extent there is arguably ambiguity 
as to the meaning of “minor child” in § 1255(d), moreover, 
we note that the BIA’s “long-standing interpretation . . . that 
the undefined term ‘minor child’ means a ‘child,’ as defined 
in section [1101](b)(1) of the [INA],” In re Le, 25 I. & N. 
Dec. at 550; see also 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(k)(3), is consistent 
with the language and purpose of the INA as described below 
and therefore is entitled to Chevron deference.  Cf. Akram, 
721 F.3d at 856 (implicitly recognizing the reasonableness of 
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B. The Regulation Is Invalid Under Step Two 
 In Zheng, we held that where the INA appears by its 
plain terms to render a class of aliens eligible to apply for 
adjustment of status under § 1255(a) and the Attorney 
General by regulation has barred that class from eligibility, 
we review the regulation at Chevron Step Two to “determine 
‘whether the regulation harmonizes with the plain language of 
the statute, its origin, and purpose.  So long as the regulation 
bears a fair relationship to the language of the statute, reflects 
the views of those who sought its enactment, and matches the 
purpose they articulated, it will merit deference.’”  422 F.3d 
at 119 (quoting O’Leary, 93 F.3d at 110).  That deference, 
however, is not unconditional, for while the Attorney 
General’s discretionary authority under § 1255(a) “may be 
ambiguous enough to allow for some regulatory eligibility 
standards, it does not so totally abdicate authority to the 
Attorney General as to allow a regulation . . . that essentially 
reverses the eligibility structure set out by Congress.”  Id. at 
120.    
 Here, as in Zheng, we conclude the Regulation does 
reverse Congress’s eligibility structure and must be struck 
down as “manifestly contrary” to the INA.  Id. at 112 
(quoting Chevron, 467 U.S. at 844).  As explained below, our 
conclusion rests on (1) the plain language of § 1255(d); 
(2) the broader structure of the INA, as informed by canons of 
statutory construction; (3) the regulatory and statutory context 
of the LIFE Act; (4) the congressional purpose behind the 
adjustment of status process; and (5) our own precedent 
                                                                                                     
the BIA’s interpretation of “minor child” by citing to In re Le 
for the proposition of defining a “minor child” as a “child” 
under the INA).  
26 
 
circumscribing the scope of the Attorney General’s regulatory 
authority under § 1255(a).  We address these grounds in turn. 
1. Plain Language 
 While the Government argues that the plain language 
of § 1255(d) imposes the Regulation’s requirement that a 
child prove a parent-child relationship with her U.S. 
stepparent in order to adjust status under § 1255(a), we read 
the statutory text to strongly indicate that Congress intended 
the opposite: that the marriage of the child’s parent to the 
child’s stepparent would itself render her eligible to apply for 
adjustment of status and that the only parent-child 
relationship of relevance to a K-4 child is the one between the 
child and her K-3 alien parent—not her U.S. stepparent.   
 By its plain terms, § 1255(d) provides that the 
Attorney General may adjust a K-visa holder’s status “as a 
result of the marriage of the nonimmigrant (or, in the case of 
a minor child, the parent) to the citizen who filed the petition 
to accord that alien’s nonimmigrant status.”  8 U.S.C. 
§ 1255(d).  A K-4 child’s eligibility to adjust status thus 
accrues “as a result of the marriage of” her K-3 parent and 
U.S. stepparent, not as a result of the K-4 child’s 
§ 1101(b)(1)(B) relationship with her U.S. stepparent.  
Indeed, the only relationships referenced in the text of 
§ 1255(d) are the marital relationship between the K-3 parent 
and the U.S. stepparent and the parent-child relationship 
between the K-3 parent and the K-4 child; nowhere in 
§ 1255(d) can we identify the source of the Regulation’s 
procedural requirement that a K-4 child be the beneficiary of 
an I-130 petition that proves she is the “child” of her new 
stepparent as defined in § 1101(b)(1)(B).  Thus, while the 
Government rests its statutory interpretation of § 1255(d) on 
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the language referring to “the citizen who filed the [I-129F] 
petition to accord [the K-4 child’s] nonimmigrant status,” see 
supra Part III.A, we read “as a result of the marriage” to be 
the operative words of the statute, making clear that it is the 
marriage between the K-3 parent and the U.S. stepparent that 
renders any K-4 child up to age twenty-one eligible to apply 
for adjustment of status.12  As such, it would stretch the 
meaning of the text beyond its limits to read the mere mention 
of the U.S. citizen petitioner in § 1255(d) to require that a K-4 
child separately prove she qualifies as the “child” of her 
stepparent under § 1101(b)(1)(B).13 
                                              
 12 The language referencing “the citizen who filed the 
petition to accord that alien’s nonimmigrant status” was 
added to § 1255(d) in 1988 during Congress’s attempt to stem 
the tide of marriage fraud.  Read in context, this language 
simply forecloses a K-visa holder from adjusting status based 
on a K-1 or K-3 alien’s marriage to a different U.S. citizen 
than the one who filed the I-129F petition on that alien’s 
behalf.  In the case of an alien fiancé(e), the statute thus 
would prevent a K-2 child from adjusting status if her parent 
were to marry someone other than the original U.S. citizen 
petitioner, and in the case of an alien spouse, the statute 
would prevent a K-4 child from adjusting status if her K-3 
parent were to divorce, once stateside, from the U.S. citizen 
spouse who initially filed the I-129F petition to accord the K-
3 and K-4 aliens their nonimmigrant visas and, perhaps, 
remarry a different U.S. citizen. 
 
 13 Nor is there a plausible argument that the “parent” 
referenced in the clause “or, in the case of a minor child, the 
parent,” refers to the U.S. stepparent, as a K-4 child’s 
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Moreover, the Government itself has already rejected 
the very argument it makes here in two different regulations.  
First, in the 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(k)(6)(ii) gap-filler, the 
Government read § 1255(d)—even before it was amended by 
the ITCA—to dispense with any need for the U.S. stepparent 
to file an I-130 petition in order for a K-2 child to be eligible 
to adjust status.  And the Government’s continued adherence 
to the gap-filler indicates that it has not departed from that 
reading of § 1255(d) in the years since the ITCA.  E.g., Aytes 
Memorandum; see also In re Akram, 25 I. & N. Dec. at 878 & 
n.6 (citing In re Le, 25 I. & N. Dec. at 546 and In re Sesay, 25 
I. & N. Dec. at 438-40).  Put another way, the Government’s 
reading of § 1255(d) in this case would seem to render its 
own gap-filling regulation ultra vires because both K-2 and 
K-4 children derive their eligibility to seek status adjustment 
under § 1255(a)(2) from the same statutory language in 
                                                                                                     
eligibility to adjust status would then accrue “as a result of the 
marriage of the [citizen] to the citizen.”  This clearly cannot 
be correct.  In contrast, reading § 1255(d) as contemplating a 
parent-child relationship between the K-3 parent and the K-4 
child, rather than between the U.S. stepparent and the K-4 
child, accords with the plain language and regulatory 
interpretations of “minor child” as used in the provision that 
authorizes K-4 visas in the first instance.  8 U.S.C. 
§ 1101(a)(15)(K)(iii) (defining K-2 and K-4 children as “the 
minor child of an alien described in clause (i) or (ii),” which 
are the definitional clauses for K-1 and K-3 alien parents, 
respectively (emphasis added)); see also In re Le, 25 I. & N. 
Dec. at 547-48 (noting “minor child” has been interpreted to 
mean “child” of the alien parent since 1973); 8 C.F.R. 
§ 214.2(k)(3); 66 Fed. Reg., at 42,589. 
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§ 1255(d).  We are hard-pressed to see how that plain 
language can be read to require an I-130 petition for a K-4 
child, but not for a K-2 child.  The Government cannot have it 
both ways. 
 Second, in defining how K-3 and K-4 aliens may 
adjust status under § 1255(a), 8 C.F.R. § 245.1(c)(6)(ii) 
provides that a K-4 child “appl[ies] for adjustment of status 
based upon the marriage of the K-3 spouse to the United 
States citizen who filed a petition on behalf of the K-3 
spouse.”  With this language, which is materially identical to 
language in 8 C.F.R. § 245.1(c)(6)(i) (defining eligibility for 
K-1 and K-2 visa holders) and which tracks the statutory text 
of § 1255(d), the Government itself has read a K-4 child’s 
eligibility to apply for adjustment of status to turn on the 
relationship between the K-3 spouse and U.S. citizen—not on 
whether the K-4 child meets § 1101(b)(1)(B)’s definition of 
“child” in relation to her new stepparent. 
 Indeed, tying adjustment to the “petition [filed] on 
behalf of the K-3 spouse,” 8 C.F.R. § 245.1(c)(6)(ii), rather 
than to a second petition filed on behalf of the K-4 child, 
makes sense given that a child obtains her K-4 visa as a 
derivative of her K-3 parent, i.e., no separate petition is filed 
in order to afford a K-4 child her initial nonimmigrant visa.  
Obtaining a visa pursuant to § 1101(a)(15)(K) is obviously a 
separate process from adjusting status under § 1255(a).  But 
because the K-4 visa—like the K-2 visa—is designed to 
reunify families and, ultimately, to serve as a stepping-stone 
toward permanent residence, the most logical reading of the 
statute as a whole is that, whatever paperwork is required 
once stateside, Congress meant to authorize an application for 
adjustment based on the marriage.  In the case of a K-2 child, 
that is handled by the filing of an I-485 petition, which 
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identifies the basis of such child’s eligibility to apply for 
status adjustment as the marriage of her K-1 parent to a U.S. 
citizen, requiring only that the child append a copy of the K-1 
parent’s “petition approval notice” and marriage certificate.  
Dep’t of Homeland Sec., Form I-485, Application to Register 
Permanent Residence or Adjust Status (revised Oct. 5, 2015), 
available at https://www.uscis.gov/sites/default/files/files/
form/i-485.pdf (last visited Mar. 22, 2016).  The Regulation’s 
requirement that a K-4 child, in contrast, have her U.S. 
stepparent file an I-130 on her behalf cannot be reconciled 
with the plain language of § 1255(d) itself nor with the 
Government’s prior interpretations of the very same text as 
embodied in 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(k)(6)(ii) and 8 C.F.R. 
§ 245.1(c)(6)(ii). 
2. Canons of Construction 
 The irreconcilable conflict between the Regulation and 
the statute becomes even more apparent when we consider 
§ 1255(d) within the broader framework of the INA.  While 
the Government urges that we should interpret 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1255 in isolation, we do not approach statutory construction 
as a myopic exercise, but rather as a holistic endeavor in 
which we “interpret the statute ‘as a symmetrical and 
coherent regulatory scheme,’ and ‘fit, if possible, all parts 
into an harmonious whole.’”  FDA v. Brown & Williamson 
Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 133 (2000) (first quoting 
Gustafson v. Alloyd Co., 513 U.S. 561, 569 (1995); then 
quoting FTC v. Mandel Bros., Inc., 359 U.S. 385, 389 
(1959)); Shalom Pentecostal, 783 F.3d at 164-65 (considering 
the overall design of the INA when assessing the plain 
meaning of a statutory provision under a Chevron Step One 
analysis); Alaka v. Att’y Gen., 456 F.3d 88, 104-05 (3d Cir. 
2006) (considering the overall design of the INA when 
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interpreting a single provision).  We therefore apply this 
“traditional tool[] of statutory construction” to interpret 
§ 1255(d) in its statutory context, see Chevron, 467 U.S. at 
843 n.9; Bautista v. Att’y Gen., 744 F.3d 54, 58 (3d Cir. 
2014), and, in doing so, identify no less than six relevant 
canons of statutory interpretation that support our conclusion. 
 First, where a statutory provision lists multiple 
categories of individuals without differentiating between 
them, Congress is presumed to have intended that all such 
categories be treated the same.  See Clark v. Martinez, 543 
U.S. 371, 377-78 (2005) (concluding that, when a section of 
the INA listed three categories of aliens without 
differentiating between them, the statute clearly expressed 
that all categories be treated the same because to treat each 
category differently would “give the[] same words a different 
meaning for each category [and] would be to invent a statute 
rather than interpret one”).  Here, Congress authorized both 
K-2 and K-4 visas in a single subsection, 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1101(a)(15)(K)(iii), reflecting congressional intent to 
accord the same treatment to the two categories of visa 
holders.  The Government urges that § 1101(a)(15)(K) is 
irrelevant to the propriety of the Regulation because it defines 
only the mechanism by which one obtains a K-visa and has 
nothing to do with adjustment of status under § 1255(a) and 
(d).  We agree that § 1101(a)(15)(K) on its face does not 
speak to adjustment of status, but Congress’s decision to 
address K-2 and K-4 visas together and without 
differentiation in both § 1101(a)(15)(K)(iii) and § 1255(d) 
provides textual and structural support for according them the 
same treatment for adjustment purposes.  See Clark, 543 U.S. 
at 377-78. 
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 Second, we “normally” give “identical words and 
phrases within the same statute . . . the same meaning,” 
Powerex Corp. v. Reliant Energy Servs., Inc., 551 U.S. 224, 
232 (2007), and, here, Congress used the term “minor child” 
in both of the subsections dealing with K-visa holders: 
§ 1101(a)(15)(K)(iii) and § 1255(d).  The Government 
nonetheless would have us read “minor child” in 
§ 1101(a)(15)(K)(iii) to mean the child of the K-3 alien parent 
(for purposes of a K-4 child obtaining a K-visa), but then read 
“minor child” in § 1255(d) to mean the child of the U.S. 
stepparent (for purposes of a K-4 child adjusting status—thus 
triggering § 1101(b)(1)(B)’s definition of stepchild for 
adjustment purposes only and justifying the Regulation’s bar 
to status adjustment for children whose parents wed after the 
child turns eighteen).  Even putting aside that the Government 
eschews the latter interpretation of this very term in § 1255(d) 
as it relates to K-2 children, there is no textual basis for its 
reading of the statute, see supra note 13, nor any indication 
Congress intended to alter whose child a K-4 “minor child” 
must be for purposes of the K-visa versus adjustment of 
status.  Rather, the text and this interpretive canon lead us to 
conclude the term should be interpreted the same way in both 
places, covering the § 1101(b)(1) children of the K-3 alien 
parent up to age twenty-one, see supra note 13, both for 
purposes of obtaining a K-4 visa and for adjusting status once 
stateside. 
 Third, “our duty to construe statutes, not isolated 
provisions,” Gustafson, 513 U.S. at 568, means that 
definitions in other parts of the INA may also shed light on 
what Congress envisioned would be necessary for a K-4 child 
to apply to adjust her status.  In this case, 8 U.S.C. § 1186a—
the provision explicitly cross-referenced in § 1255(d) that 
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describes the conditional lawful permanent residence status 
for which K-visa holders apply under § 1255(a) and (d)—
provides further evidence that Congress did not intend to 
require a K-4 child to prove she is the “child” of her U.S. 
stepparent to apply for adjustment of status.  Section 
1186a(h)(2) defines the “alien son or daughter” who is subject 
to the strictures of § 1186a as “an alien who obtains the status 
of an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence . . . by 
virtue of being the son or daughter of an individual through a 
qualifying marriage.”  8 U.S.C. § 1186a(h)(2) (emphasis 
added).  The Government’s reading of § 1255(d) would 
require us to interpret the word “individual” in § 1186a(h)(2) 
to refer only to the petitioning U.S. stepparent.  But where 
Congress intended to distinguish between the terms “alien 
spouse” and “petitioning spouse,” it did so, as reflected 
elsewhere in § 1186a.  See, e.g., id. § 1186a(c)(3)(A)(ii) (“If . 
. . the alien spouse and petitioning spouse appear at the 
interview [to remove the conditional nature of the alien 
spouse’s lawful permanent residence] . . .”); id. 
§ 1186a(h)(1), (4) (separately defining “alien spouse” and 
“petitioning spouse,” respectively).  Congress opted not to do 
so in defining “alien son or daughter” in § 1186a(h)(2), and, 
as the Supreme Court has said, “[w]here Congress includes 
particular language in one section of a statute but omits it 
from another section of the same Act, it is generally presumed 
that Congress acts intentionally and purposely in the disparate 
inclusion or exclusion,” Russello v. United States, 464 U.S. 
16, 23 (1983) (quoting United States v. Wong Kim Bo, 472 
F.2d 720, 722 (5th Cir. 1972)); see also Shalom Pentecostal, 
783 F.3d at 165.  We thus accord significance to Congress’s 
decision to describe an alien son or daughter’s basis for 
admission to legal permanent residence under § 1186a—and, 
by extension, under § 1255(d)—not as her status as the child 
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of the “petitioning spouse,” but as her status as the son or 
daughter of either parent, so long as it is “through a 
qualifying marriage.”  8 U.S.C. § 1186a(h)(2). 
 Fourth, we find confirmation of Congress’s intent in 
“the title of a statute and the heading of a section,” both of 
which are “‘tools available for the resolution of a doubt’ 
about the meaning of a statute.”  Almendarez-Torres v. United 
States, 523 U.S. 224, 234 (1998) (quoting Bhd. of R.R. 
Trainmen v. Balt. & Ohio R.R. Co., 331 U.S. 519, 528-59 
(1947)).  The part of the LIFE Act that created K-4 visas and 
extended § 1255(d) to cover them is entitled “Encouraging 
Immigrant Family Reunification,” Pub. L. No. 106-553, tit. 
XI, 114 Stat. 2762, 2762A-142 (2000) (as amended 2000), 
making apparent that Congress intended K-4 visas to enable 
family reunification for parents and children up to age 
twenty-one who were seeking lawful permanent residence—
not to authorize a temporary visit and concomitant statutory 
bar on the eighteen to twenty-one year olds in that group from 
ever adjusting status from within the United States.  To 
interpret the LIFE Act to require these children to separate 
from their parents and younger siblings in the United States 
and return to their home countries to apply for lawful 
permanent residence would hardly “Encourag[e] Immigrant 
Family Reunification”; it would statutorily impede it. 
 Fifth, we interpret statutes consistent with the canon 
that “Congress . . . does not alter the fundamental details of a 
regulatory scheme in vague terms or ancillary provisions—it 
does not, one might say, hide elephants in mouseholes.”  
Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, 531 U.S. 457, 468 (2001).  
Yet the Government would take us on a circuitous route 
through the INA to explain how § 1255(d) should be read to 
impose—by virtue of stringing together §§ 1255(a), 
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1154(a)(1)(A)(i), and 1101(b)(1)(B), see supra Part III.A—a 
devastating burden on K-4 children that is inconsistent with 
the statutory treatment of, and the agency’s own preexisting 
regulatory framework for, K-2 children.  The strictures of 
statutory construction compel us instead to stay on the clear 
path paved by the language of § 1255(d).   
 Finally, we avoid interpreting statutes in a way that 
would render them absurd.  See, e.g., Republic of Iraq v. 
Beaty, 556 U.S. 848, 861 (2009) (discounting a proffered 
statutory interpretation in part because it would have been “an 
absurd reading, not only textually but in the result it 
produces”); Holy Trinity Church v. United States, 143 U.S. 
457, 459-60 (1892) (construing a law “to avoid [] absurdity”).  
Under the current regime, if a nineteen-year-old child of an 
alien spouse stays behind in her home country while her alien 
parent moves to the United States and adjusts status, that 
child would be eligible to apply for lawful permanent 
residence from abroad, albeit through a long and arduous 
process.  The very purpose of K-visas, however, is to allow 
for family reunification stateside pending adjustment of status 
for the alien parent and minor children of the new family.  It 
is therefore surely “unreasonable to believe that the 
legislat[ure] intended,” Holy Trinity Church, 143 U.S. at 459, 
that, in granting K-4 visas to older alien children, it was, in 
effect, disqualifying any such child who chose to exercise that 
visa from seeking lawful permanent residence from within the 
United States.  Indeed, the Government’s reading of 
§ 1255(d) would transform K-4 visas for older K-4 children 
into nothing more than tourist visas, giving their holders only 
a glimpse of what life with their families might have been like 
in America before being sent home because they are legally 
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incapable of fulfilling § 1255(a)(2)’s eligibility requirement.  
Such a reading defies common sense. 
3. Statutory and Regulatory Context  
 The regulatory and statutory backdrop to the LIFE Act 
further demonstrates that the Regulation is incompatible with 
Congress’s eligibility scheme, for “Congress is presumed to 
be aware of an administrative or judicial interpretation of a 
statute and to adopt that interpretation when it re-enacts a 
statute without change . . . [or] adopts a new law 
incorporating sections of a prior law, . . . at least insofar as 
[the prior interpretation] affects the new statute.”  Lorillard v. 
Pons, 434 U.S. 575, 580-81 (1978) (citations omitted).  Here, 
before passing the LIFE Act in 2000, Congress was aware 
that the INS had promulgated 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(k)(6)(ii) to fill 
the gap for older K-2 children and to ensure they would be 
eligible to apply for adjustment of status on the basis of the 
qualifying marriage, without having to demonstrate a parent-
child relationship with their new stepparent.  And, of course, 
Congress itself had amended § 1255(d) in 1988 to specify that 
K-2 children could apply for status adjustment “as a result of 
the marriage.”14  ITCA § 7(b).  Against this backdrop, 
                                              
 14 Indeed, there can be no question as to Congress’s 
awareness of the prior existence of 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(k)(6)(ii) 
because the gap-filler not only was on the books for twelve 
years before the LIFE Act, but also was promulgated at the 
same time as the ITCA, which added the “as a result of the 
marriage” language to § 1255(d).  The fact that the ITCA was 
moving its way through Congress at the same time the gap-
filler was working its way through administrative rulemaking 
indicates that both Congress and the Attorney General were—
even at the time of the gap-filler’s initial promulgation—on 
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Congress’s re-enactment of this language without alteration 
when it extended § 1255(d) to the newly-created K-3 and K-4 
visa holders indicates it expected K-4 children to likewise 
benefit from the gap-filler.  
The Government counters that Congress also was 
aware of the age restriction for a stepchild to qualify as a 
“child” under § 1101(b)(1) and thus intended the LIFE Act to 
create a gap for older K-4 children.  We reject this argument 
for three reasons.  First, by adding the “as a result of the 
marriage” language to § 1255(d) in 1988, Congress created an 
alternative basis for eligibility to apply for status adjustment, 
eliminating the need for K-2 and K-4 children to qualify as 
the “child[ren]” of their U.S. stepparents under § 1101(b)(1).  
See supra Part III.B.1.  Second, the statutory text makes plain 
that the only adult with whom a K-4 child must have a 
§ 1101(b)(1) parent-child relationship is the K-3 alien parent.  
See id.  Third, Lorillard counsels that, while Congress was 
presumptively aware of § 1101(b)(1)’s definition of “child” 
when it passed the LIFE Act, it was also presumptively aware 
that the INS had long interpreted “minor child” to mean an 
individual under age twenty-one and already interpreted 
§ 1255(d), through the gap-filler regulation, to relieve K-2 
children of the strictures of § 1101(b)(1) for purposes of 
adjusting status.15  See 434 U.S. at 580-81.  Thus, had 
                                                                                                     
notice of each other’s interpretations.  See, e.g., Williamson 
Shaft Contracting Co. v. Phillips, 794 F.2d 865, 870 (3d Cir. 
1986) (presuming that Congress was aware of a regulation 
that had been promulgated eight years earlier). 
 
 15 Lorillard also further confirms that the term “minor 
child” in § 1255(d) should be understood to mean “child” as 
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Congress intended to deviate from the gap-filler’s existing 
interpretation, we would expect such deviation to have been 
explicit.  See id. 
                                                                                                     
defined in § 1101(b)(1).  The INS’s 1973 implementing 
regulation for K-visas, 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(k)(3), “incorporated 
the definition of a ‘child’ in [§ 1101(b)(1)],” which defines a 
child as an unmarried person under twenty-one for purposes 
of defining eligibility for a K-2 visa.  In re Le, 25 I. & N. 
Dec. at 548 (noting the agency has never defined “minor 
child” but has instead used the statutory definition of “child”); 
see also 66 Fed. Reg. 42,589 (Aug. 14, 2001) (“K-4 aliens 
must be under 21 years of age and unmarried, in order to 
continue to meet the definition of ‘child’ under section 
[1101(b)(1)].”); Aytes Memorandum (“Officers should NOT 
limit the adjustment of status of K-2 aliens to persons under 
the age of 18 based on the term ‘minor child’ as it appears in 
[1255(d)].  The INA does not define the term ‘minor child.’  
Section [1101](b)(1) defines the term ‘child’ as ‘an unmarried 
person under twenty-one years of age.’”).  Against the 
backdrop of the Government’s consistent “treat[ment] [of] the 
term ‘minor child’ as synonymous with the term ‘child,’” 
Congress re-enacted 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15)(K) and “carried 
the term ‘minor child’ over into [§ 1255(d)]” in 1986.  In re 
Le, 25 I. & N. Dec. at 548.  Under Lorillard, we presume that, 
in including the same term in § 1255(d) in both the ITCA and, 
twelve years later, the LIFE Act, Congress was aware of and 
acquiesced to this definition.  434 U.S. at 580-81.   
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4. Congressional Purpose 
 Setting aside the text, structure, and history of the 
INA, the Government contends the Regulation is a reasonable 
exercise of the Attorney General’s regulatory authority 
because it furthers Congress’s intent to combat marriage 
fraud.  According to the Government, there is a greater risk 
that K-3 and K-4 aliens will fraudulently obtain lawful 
permanent residence than their K-1 and K-2 counterparts 
because the marriages take place on foreign soil and because 
alien spouses are subject to fewer prophylactic fraud 
prevention measures than alien fiancé(e)s.16  While the 
Government’s interest in combatting marriage fraud is 
indisputably a valid one, the Government fails to explain how 
the Regulation furthers this goal and thus cannot justify the 
Regulation on this basis. 
                                              
 16 Specifically, the Government places significance on 
the fact that fiancé(e)s undergo scrutiny of their intent to 
marry before being admitted to the United States (i.e., in the 
I-129F petition, upon applying for a K-1 visa, and before 
entry to the United States) and that they must establish their 
marriage is legitimate at the time of adjustment under § 1255, 
and again later when seeking to lift the conditional status 
conferred under § 1186a.  See, e.g., In re Sesay, 25 I. & N. 
Dec. at 442.  It is unclear to us how these examples show any 
marked difference with alien spouses, who also must aver to 
their marriage on the I-129F petition and again during the 
interview that accompanies their application and must 
demonstrate a valid marriage both upon initial adjustment of 
status (via an I-130 petition) and when being interviewed to 
lift the § 1186a conditions on such status. 
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 First, the INA already provides the Government with 
several means of combatting marriage fraud.  A K-3 parent 
must have her initial visa petition—which includes proof of a 
valid marriage—approved before she and her children may 
even enter the United States, and the lawful permanent 
resident status that K-3 and K-4 aliens obtain thereafter is 
conditional under § 1186a.  See supra Part I.A.   This 
conditional status remains in place until the married couple 
jointly files to lift this designation in the ninety-day window 
preceding the second anniversary of obtaining conditional 
legal status.  See 8 U.S.C. § 1186a(c)(1)(A), (c)(3)(B), 
(d)(2)(A).  Only if, after an interview with the couple, the 
Government concludes that the marriage is not fraudulent 
does the alien’s status and that of her children become truly 
permanent.  See id. § 1186a(c)(1)(B), (c)(3).  On the other 
hand, if at any time during this two-year period the 
Government concludes the marriage was fraudulent or has 
been annulled or terminated, the alien’s permanent resident 
status is rescinded and she and, by extension, her children are 
rendered removable.  See id. §§ 1186a(b)(1), (c)(3)(C); 
1227(a)(1)(D)(i).  This temporary, conditional status thus 
provides the Government with a backstop to prevent 
fraudulent marriages from resulting in permanent legal status 
and an additional mechanism to catch fraud that may have 
slipped through an initial review.  Accord Gallimore v. Att’y 
Gen., 619 F.3d 216, 222 (3d Cir. 2010) (“The purpose of [the 
§ 1186a] scheme is obvious: to ferret out sham marriages 
entered into for the purpose of obtaining entry into the United 
States.”). 
 Second, and more fundamentally, the Government has 
failed to explain why a regulation that targets the children—
and more precisely, the older children—of alien spouses in 
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any way advances the underlying effort to combat marriage 
fraud.  That goal may be served by careful scrutiny of the K-3 
parent’s I-129F and I-130 petitions and the documentation 
required at the visa interview to prove both the K-3 parent’s 
relationship with the U.S. citizen-spouse and the children’s 
relationship with their K-3 parent, but the Government has 
not shown how it is served by requiring a second I-130 
petition on behalf of a K-4 child.  Indeed, the Government 
candidly conceded at oral argument that the Regulation’s 
effect of forcing older K-4 children back overseas does not 
prevent marriage fraud.  Oral Arg. at 31:40-32:10.17   
 The stated goal of combatting marriage fraud thus 
cannot explain the Regulation’s differential treatment of K-2 
and K-4 children or why the Government should, in effect, 
accord less value to the dignity and integrity of a family unit 
when a U.S. citizen is already married to an alien spouse than 
when an alien is entering the United States with the stated 
intention of marrying a U.S. citizen.  In short, the 
Government has failed to show the Regulation is “based on a 
permissible construction of the statute,” Zheng, 422 F.3d at 
116 (quoting Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843), or “comport[s] with 
Congress’s stated intent,” id. at 119, to combat marriage 
fraud. 
                                              
 17 An audio recording of the oral argument is available 
online, at http://www2.ca3.uscourts.gov/oralargument/audio/
14-4831Cenv.AttyGenUSA.mp3. 
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5. Limits on the Attorney General’s Regulatory 
Authority 
 Finally, the considerations that led us in Zheng to hold 
that the regulation in that case exceeded the permissible scope 
of the Attorney General’s regulatory authority under 
§ 1255(a) compel the same conclusion here.  Zheng instructed 
that we pay heed to “our obligation to respect the decisions of 
the immigration agencies” but recognized our “even higher 
obligation to respect the clearly expressed will of Congress.”  
422 F.3d at 120.  And while acknowledging the Attorney 
General’s authority under § 1255(a) to regulate eligibility to 
apply for adjustment of status, Zheng demarcated the bounds 
of that authority:  Where Congress has made clear through the 
statutory language, structure, history, and purpose its intent to 
authorize a certain class of aliens to apply for adjustment of 
status, a regulation that strips such aliens of eligibility 
altogether cannot be deemed “reasonable in light of the 
legislature’s revealed design.”  Id. at 116 (quoting 
NationsBank, 513 U.S. at 257); see id. at 119-20. 
 Here, the Attorney General overstepped those bounds.  
Whereas Congress envisioned that an alien spouse and her K-
4 children up to age twenty-one could enter the United States 
and live as a family with the U.S. spouse while applying for 
adjustment of status, the Regulation makes it legally 
impossible for an older K-4 child to apply at all, so long as 
she remains part of the family unit.  And whereas, by enacting 
§ 1255(d), Congress closed a gap that would have forced such 
children to return to their home countries if they had passed 
their eighteenth birthday by the date of their parent’s 
marriage, the Regulation “essentially reverses the eligibility 
structure set out by Congress,” id. at 120, by reopening that 
gap and thereby categorically barring the otherwise eligible 
43 
 
class of older K-4 children from applying for adjustment 
within the United States.  Thus, as in Zheng, the Regulation 
cannot be “harmonize[d] with the plain language of the 
[INA], its origin, and purpose,” id. at 119 (quoting O’Leary, 
93 F.3d at 110), and cannot survive scrutiny under Chevron 
Step Two.18 
IV. Conclusion 
 While the nation’s immigration laws are at times 
labyrinthine, we decline to hold today that they offer older K-
4 children nothing more than a legal dead end.  For the 
aforementioned reasons, although we reach our decision at 
Chevron Step Two rather than Step One, we ultimately agree 
with the thoughtful decision of the Seventh Circuit in Akram 
and likewise hold that 8 C.F.R. § 245.1(i) is invalid.  
Accordingly, we will grant Cen’s petition for review, reverse 
                                              
 18 We leave to the Department of Homeland Security 
and the Attorney General, pursuant to her regulatory 
authority, the appropriate mechanism to resolve this problem, 
whether through providing a basis for eligibility analogous to 
what now exists for K-2 children under the 8 C.F.R. 
§ 214.2(k)(6)(ii) gap-filler (as effectuated by the I-485 
petition) or otherwise.  We note, however, that should the 
Government decline to promulgate a regulation mirroring 8 
C.F.R. § 214.2(k)(6)(ii) and instead simply allow a K-4 child 
to adjust on the basis of an I-130 petition filed by her K-3 
parent once that parent obtains lawful permanent residence, 
the strictures of § 1255(a) would still require that K-4 child 
prove the immediate availability of a country-specific visa, 
see 8 U.S.C. § 1153(a)(2), thus denying her the same benefits 
enjoyed under the gap-filler by her K-2 counterparts. 
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the Board’s decision, and remand Cen’s case for proceedings 
consistent with this opinion. 
